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Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive
Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality
Review?
By Ronald J. Gilson* and Reinier Kraakman**

The courts have long struggled with a standard for reviewing management's
efforts to deter or defeat hostile takeovers. The usual standards of review in
corporate law, the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test, do not
seem adequate when courts must evaluate defensive measures that implicate
both management's business acumen and its loyalty to shareholder interests.
Because evaluating a sale of the company is a complex business decision,
management's response to a takeover bid resembles the normal business decisions that the business judgment rule largely insulates from judicial review.' At
the same time, however, a hostile takeover creates a potential conflict of interest,
no matter what response it evokes from management. Target managers who
approve an offer may be improperly influenced by post-transaction benefits;'
target managers who reject an offer may act largely to secure their own
*Mr. Gilson, a member of the California bar, is professor of law at Stanford Law School and senior
research fellow at the Hoover Institute.
**Mr. Kraakman is professor of law at Harvard Law School.
The authors thank Judy Hogan for her valuable research assistance and Joseph Grundfest, Leo
Herzel, William Klein, W. Loeber Landau, and Charles Murdock for their valuable comments on
an earlier version of this article.
The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the authors and do not represent those of
the American Law Institute, for whose Principlesof Corporate Governance one of the authors is
serving as Reporter.
Editor'snote: E. Norman Veasey of the Delaware bar served as reviewer for this article.
1. This argument has formed the core of Martin Lipton's tenacious defense of an undiluted
application of the business judgment rule to defensive conduct. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. Law. 1017 (1981); Lipton & Brownstein,
Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. Law. 1403 (1985). More
recently, Upton has concluded that, if abusive tactics by bidders were curbed, most defensive tactics
would no longer be justified. See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism,
136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
2. The best example is a third-party leveraged buyout in which management participates. In
such a transaction, target management receives a substantial ownership interest in the company if
the buyout is completed. For example, in a sample of 28 companies given management buyout
proposals between 1979 and 1984, target management's ownership interest in the company at the
time of the proposal averaged 6.5%; in the 15 transactions consummated as buyouts, management's
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positions. From this perspective, responding to a hostile takeover is an interested
transaction that calls for judicial review under the intrinsic fairness test. Yet,
invoking this rigorous standard would simply condemn moit defensive tactics
without any justification beyond the standird itself.'
In this article, we examine the Delaware courts' most recent response to the
tension between the intrinsic fairness standard and the business judgment
the takeover context: An intermediate standard of review mandating
standard irl
that management's defensive tactics must be "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed" 4 by a hostile offer. The evolutionary trajectory of this proportionality test
is far from certain. Our goal here is neither to endorse proportionality review as
the best approach to regulating defensive tactics nor to provide an exhaustive
account of recent Delaware case law. Rather, taking Delaware's adoption of
proportionality review as given, we seek to facilitate the informed development
of this standard as rapidly, and with as little ambiguity, as possible.
There is good reason to chart the range of possible interpretations of Delaware's new test at an early date. Delaware corporate law-in which the
proportionality test now plays a major role-governs the largest proportion of
the largest business transactions in history. Yet, the sheer volume of takeover
litigation threatens to deprive the proportionality test of the time and experience
that ordinarily inform the articulation of a major common law doctrine. Therefore, commentary that attempts to resolve uncertainty about the substance of the
proportionality test is critical.
This article begins by tracing the origins of the Delaware proportionality test.
It then identifies two questions that are key to evaluating whether the proportionality test has substance. First, does the test require more than just a
threshold inquiry; that is, if target management can show that some defensive
action may be warranted, must the court nonetheless evaluate the appropriateness of management's particular response? Second, what characteristics of a
hostile offer warrant defensive action; that is, what threats to shareholder
interests might a tender offer pose? The next section examines in greater detail
one of the most common-and for the proportionality test, the most troublesome
-of the threats that target managers identify in support of defensive tactics.
This threat, which we term "substantive coercion," is the claim that shareholders will voluntarily tender to an underpriced offer. Finally, we describe both the
key elements and the beneficial consequences of a proportionality test that can
effectively screen target managements' claims of shareholder coercion by underpriced offers.

ownership interest rose to an average of 24.3% after the transaction. Lowenstein, Management
Buyouts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 730, 736-37 (1985).
3. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 824-31 (1981).
4. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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THE ORIGINS OF THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST
The proportionality test is not the Delaware courts' first effort to wrestle with
the difficulty of reviewing defensive tactics. Long before the most recent wave of
takeover cases, Cheff v. Mathes" demonstrated the subtlety with which the
Delaware courts could disarm the seeming conflict between the intrinsic fairness
and business judgment standards of review in takeover settings. Cheff framed a
policy conflict/primary purpose test under which management's motives set the
standard of review for defensive tactics. If a target's directors could demonstrate
disagreement over corporate policy with a would-be acquirer, they were presumed to act from business considerations rather than self-interest. With the
specter of a breach of duty of loyalty thus conveniently set aside, the appropriate
standard of review became the business judgment rule: "[T]he directors satisfy
their burden by showing good faith and reasonable investigation; the directors
will not be penalized for an honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment
appeared reasonable at the time the decision was made."' Because competent
counsel could always document a policy conflict between a would-be acquirer
and defending management, the Cheff test inevitably reduced to a routine
application of the business judgment standard.
Ironically, Cheff's resolution of the problem of judicial review survived
unchanged only as long as its implication-blanket protection of defensive
tactics-remained at least partly submerged. By the early 1980s, this implication was fully visible. Novel financing techniques and a dramatic rise in
takeover activity stimulated demand for improved takeover defenses. New
defenses, in turn, prompted new litigation and a long string of victories for
targets7 that soon revealed the full scope of management's discretion to block
takeovers under Cheffs motive analysis.' Experienced takeover lawyers passed
Cheffs implicit message on to their clients:' If target managers, in good faith
and after reasonable investigation, could locate a policy conflict with a would-be

5. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). For a detailed analysis of the authors' view of the
Cheff test, see Gilson, supra note 3.
6. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
7. Although defensive tactics were enjoined in a number of cases in this period, most of the losing
targets were smaller companies without the benefit of advice from special counsel and investment
bankers. See Podesta v. Calumet Indus., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,433 (N.D. I1. 1978); Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145

(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
8. The expansion of management's freedom to take action to deflect hostile offers probably hit its
apogee in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
9. Arguably the interpretations of case law by experienced takeover lawyers are among the most
important sources of takeover law. It is these interpretations, after all, that give operational content
to the law. The discretion that Cheff appeared to promise from the outset remained latent until an
accumulation of favorable precedent encouraged the corporate bar to exploit the full implications of
the motive test.
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acquirer, any defensive response would be protected under the business judgment rule.'
As Cheff's implications became clearly visible, however, they attracted hostile
notice from other corners. An outpouring of academic commentary called for
constraints on defensive tactics," and it even appeared possible that Congress
might act to displace state law-and especially Delaware law-that was considered unduly favorable to target management. The political situation thus
recalled the period prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Singer v.
Magnavox." At that time, the sensitive issue was the dearth of standards
governing the freezeout of minority shareholders by majority or controlling
shareholders. And when the outcry became too loud, the Delaware Supreme
Court announced a new, seemingly more stringent standard of review that
promised to constrain management's discretion to force out minority shareholders." Thus, there was a historical basis for predicting that political pressure
might eventually prompt the Delaware courts to tighten the lax standard of
review implicit in Cheff's policy conflict/primary purpose test.
In principle, the Delaware courts had two quite different doctrinal options
for reforming the Cheff standard. On the one hand, the courts could have
restricted defensive tactics by emphasizing the primacy of shareholder choice to
accept or reject a hostile offer. This approach recognizes the role of the tender
offer with respect to the structure of the corporation. Precisely because target
management can unilaterally block a merger or sale of assets, a takeover can
occur without management approval only through a tender offer made directly
to target shareholders. Thus, management enjoys a monopoly over corporate
control unless it is restrained from preventing shareholders from tendering to a
hostile offeror. 4 Alternatively, the courts could have moved from the Cheff
standard to an intermediate standard of judicial review that contemplated a
genuine effort to distinguish defensive tactics that might benefit shareholders
from suspect tactics designed to entrench management.
10. Martin Lipton put the matter as follows: "Where the directors have made a reasonable
good-faith decision to reject the takeover on one or more of the bases set forth above, the business
judgment rule should apply equally to any and all defensive tactics." Lipton, Takeover Bids inthe
Target's Boardroom, supra note 1, at 124.
11. See, e.g., Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
Cornell L. Rev. 901 (1979); Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management
in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 403 (1980); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981); Gilson,
supra note 3; Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028

(1982).
12. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
13. For suggestions that the Delaware court's decision in Singer was influenced by political
considerations, see, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 Yale

L.J. 1354, 1354 n.2 (1978); R. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 870-72
(1986); Herzel & Coiling, Squeeze-Out Mergers in Delaware-The Delaware Supreme Court

Decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 7 Corp. L. Rev. 195, 229-30 (1984); Thompson, SqueezeOut Mergers and the "New" Appraisal Remedy, 62 Wash. U.L.Q. 415, 420 (1984).

14. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 841-50.
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In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court opted for the more conservative of the
two approaches-the intermediate standard of review-in a trilogy of decisions
handed down in 1985 and early 1986: Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum,15 Moran v.
7
Household International and Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings.1
These opinions fortify the older Cheff standard by adding a second step to the
traditional policy conflict/primary purpose analysis. Under the new standard,
management can no longer qualify for the protections of the business judgment
rule simply by pointing to a "danger to corporate policy" based on a carefully
orchestrated record. Now, defensive tactics must also face a proportionality test:
They must be shown to be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'"
The proportionality test brings a novel, objective standard to the review of
defensive tactics-a reasonableness test that impliedly allows courts to identify
and reject unreasonable tactics, whatever the motives of their authors. For
corporate planners, however, the critical issue is how far the Delaware Supreme
Court intends this novel rhetoric to signal a change in the actual substance of
review. Again, Delaware's experience with adopting a more restrictive standard
governing minority freezeouts provides a cautionary tale for the planner. In
Singer v. Magnavox, 9 the Delaware Supreme Court boldly announced a new
burden on controlling shareholders to show that freezeouts met an "entire
fairness" standard and served an independent business purpose apart from
simply eliminating minority shareholders. Yet, by the time that Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.2" was decided six years later, Singer's requirements had dwindled to
little more than an inquiry into the fairness of the price paid to minority
shareholders." The key question, then, is whether a similar fate awaits the new
standard for reviewing defensive tactics. Put differently, is proportionality
review likely to have substance?

15.
16.
17.
18.

493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. In Revlon, the court summarized both steps in the review:

[W]hen a board implements anti-takeover measures there arises "the omnipresent specter that
a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and
its shareholders..." This potential for conflict places upon the directors the burden of proving
that they had reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness, a burden satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation. In
addition, the directors must analyze the nature of the takeover and its effect on the corporation
in order to ensure balance-that the responsive action is reasonable in relation tothe threat
posed.
506 A.2d at 180 (citations omitted).
19. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
20. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
21. Id. at715. See R. Gilson, supra note 13, at 904-07.
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THE MEANING OF PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
The uncertainty attending second-step proportionality review in the wake of
Unocal, Moran, and Revlon centers on three issues. The initial question is
whether the new standard is intended to be a substantive constraint on defensive
tactics or merely another formal justification for defensive tactics that corporate
planners must recite to succeed. If the standard is substantive, as we believe it is,
two further questions follow from the requirement that defensive tactics be
"reasonable" in relation to a "threat." First, does the new standard regulate
defensive responses or merely pose a threshold test; that is, supposing some

threat is shown, how far does the new standard nonetheless constrain the range
of permissible tactics? Second, and closely related, what forms of hostile offers,
if any, might fail to qualify as "threats" and so preclude any defensive tactics
under the proportionality test?

DOES PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW HAVE
SUBSTANCE?
Unocal, Moran, and Revlon can be read to suggest that proportionality
review is primarily a formal, rhetorical instruction rather than substantive
standard of review.22 Under this reading, the new standard, like the old policy

conflict/primary purpose test, serves chiefly to signal judicial concern and to
invite planners to proceed with their defenses only after constructing a record
that demonstrates reasonableness and that articulates a "threat." The best
evidence for this construction is how little effort the Delaware Supreme Court
devoted to determining that the discriminatory repurchase in Unocal" and the
poison pill in Moran24 were "proportional" to the threats posed by two-tier,
front-end loaded offers and offers financed by junk bonds (or any offers made by
T. Boone Pickens 25 ). The Revlon case, moreover, may be consistent with this
22. See, e.g., Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors,
136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 315, 332-37 (1987).
23. In Unocal, the court's entire discussion of the coercive impact of two-tier offers consisted of
the following sentence: "It is now well recognized that such [two-tiered] offers are a classic coercive
measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is
inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the transaction." 493 A.2d at 956
(citation omitted).
24. In Moran, the court's discussion of proportionality review consisted of the following
paragraph:
[T]o meet their burden, the Directors must show that the defensive mechanism was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." The record reflects a concern on the part of the Directors
over the increasing frequency in the financial services industry of "boot-strap" and "bust-up"
takeovers. The Directors were also concerned that such takeovers may take the form of two-tier
offers.... In sum, the Directors reasonably believed Household was vulnerable to coercive
acquisition techniques and adopted a reasonable defensive mechanism to protect itself.
500 A.2d at 1356-57.
25. In Unocal, the court seems to have held that the very fact that the offer was made by Pickens
constituted a sufficient threat: "Wholly beyond the coercive aspect of an inadequate two-tier tender
offer, the threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer.' " 493
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minimalist construction insofar as it pointedly invokes the directors' duty of
loyalty in lieu of a proportionality argument when it enjoins management's
26
defensive lock-up option.
Construing proportionality review as simple rhetoric is difficult, however,
because the Delaware court has taken such care to announce and reiterate the
new standard. The court surely could have found less confusing ways to
demonstrate rhetorical concern than to articulate a new and potentially farreaching standard of review. A more prudent reading of the cases takes proportionality review seriously. The cases introducing the new standard point to the
significance of concrete threats. 27 The Mesa offer in Unocal was at least
potentially coercive, and the poison pill in Moran, because it could be redeemed
by the board, did not foreclose a particular offer. Indeed, the court in Moran
stressed that, should the board determine not to redeem the pill when an actual
offer was made, its decision could then be reviewed under the two-step test.
Thus, declining to redeem the pill would itself qualify as a defensive tactic that
management would have to justify as reasonable in relation to the threat posed
by the particular offer.2"
Yet, concluding that Unocal, Moran, and Revlon are likely to contemplate a
form of substantive review by the courts only begins the inquiry. The more
difficult questions concern how rigorous a developed standard of proportionality
review is likely to become.
A.2d at 956. The court expressed a similar view of Pickens in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987).
26. The court stated that "when the Revlon board entered into an auction-ending lock-up
agreement with Forstmann on the basis of impermissible considerations (the fear of threatened
litigation by noteholders) at the expense of the shareholders, the directors breached their primary
duty of loyalty." 506 A.2d at 182. Revlon also sets an additional limit on the operation of the
proportionality test. Once it becomes "inevitable" that the target company will be sold, the
obligation of the board changes appreciably:
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity
to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This
significantly altered the board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly
inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.
Id. See also Ivanhoe Partners,535 A.2d at 1338 (distinguishing between the proportionality test and
"the Revlon obligation to conduct a sale of the corporation"). Determining when a sale becomes
inevitable, therefore, is a critical question. For example, if target directors adopt a restructuring
plan in response to a hostile bid, is the plan a defensive tactic governed by Unocal proportionality
review, or is it a competing bid that demonstrates the inevitability of the company's sale, thereby
triggering the Revlon auction standard? See infra note 65.
27. As the Delaware Chancery Court has recently observed: "Takeover bids found to be a threat
have typically involved a coercively structured proposal, such as a two tiered hostile tender offer."
Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924, at 90,197 (Del. Ch.
1988) (citation omitted).
28. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
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IS THE NEW STANDARD MORE THAN A
THRESHOLD TEST?
One question is whether the proportionality standard is a threshold test or a
form of regulatory review. To see this distinction clearly, consider the ambiguous holdings of Unocal and Moran, which establish that potentially coercive
bids justify some forms of defensive action without indicating the range of
permissible forms. If the proportionality standard is a threshold test, any hostile
offer that is arguably coercive would give management a free hand without
further scrutiny by the courts. By contrast, if the standard is a regulatory test,
management would be forced to justify its choice of defensive actions by
reference to the amount of coercion associated with a particular bid. This
difference is significant because any bid, apart from an any-or-all cash bid with
a commitment to freeze out non-tendering shareholders at the bid price, may
have some coercive effect on target shareholders. 9 Thus, unless the "proportionality" element in the new standard has regulatory import, second-step review
will have very little meaning for most offers as they are now framed.

29. Consider an offer that may seem non-coercive on its face: a 100% cash offer at a significant
premium, but without any commitment to buy out non-tendering shareholders at a fixed price. A
shareholder who believes that the stock is worth more than the offer, perhaps because he expects a
higher offer in the future, would prefer not to tender. However, if he does not tender while other
shareholders do tender, he will be left holding minority shares in a controlled corporation with a
market value that is likely to be well below the tender offer price. Thus any partial offer, including
an any-or-all offer without a freezeout commitment, is potentially coercive. See Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695, 1717-35
(1985). How much shareholders are actually coerced in practice, however, is open to debate. The
risk of competing bidders limits the opportunity for initially coercive bids. Thus, the evidence
suggests that the creation of an informal auction period under the Williams Act, by rule 14d-8's
extension of the minimum offering period in partial (including two-tier) offers from 10 to 20 days,
eliminated the difference in premiums between two-tier and any-or-all bids. As part of the SEC's
study of the recommendations of its Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, the Office of the Chief
Economist studied 148 tender offers between 1981 and 1983, consisting of 91 any-or-all offers, 32
two-tier offers, and 25 partial offers. Although for the entire sample the average premium in anyor-all offers exceeded that in two-tier offers by 8.3% (63.4% versus 55.1%), the order was reversed
for offers made after the lengthening of the offer period (average premium of 66.4% for two-tier
offers and 49.6% for any-and-all offers). See R. Gilson, supra note 13, at 853-54. A later study that
extended the sample to include 1984 offers (so that offers made after the extension of the offer
period comprised approximately half the sample) confirmed this result. Over the entire sample, the
premium averaged 56.6% in any-or-all offers and 55.9% in two-tier offers, a difference that was not
statistically significant. Comment & Jarrell, Two- Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The Imprisonment of the Free-Riding Shareholder, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 283, 304-10 (1987). This may explain the
recent dramatic decline in the use of two-tier bids in third-party offers. While in 1982 and 1983
there were 35 third-party two-tier bids amounting to about 20% of all tender offers, in 1985 and
1986 there were only 11 such bids amounting to only about 3%of all tender offers, and in the first
five months of 1987, there were none. See Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are Now a Defensive
Technique, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
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The recent decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in AC Acquisitions
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co." strongly argues that the proportionality test
is more than a threshold standard. For our purposes, the facts of the case can be
stated simply. A cash tender offer was made for a minimum of fifty-one percent
of Anderson, Clayton's common stock at $56 per share, with the announced
intention of a second-step freezeout merger also at $56 per share. Thus, the
hostile offer was not coercive. A shareholder who viewed the $56 price as too
low could decline to tender without fear of being disadvantaged; if other
shareholders tendered and the offer succeeded, the non-tendering shareholder
would still receive the same price.
Anderson, Clayton responded by offering an alternative transaction that the
company believed would result in greater value for its shareholders: an issuer
self-tender for sixty-five percent of its common stock at $60 per share. 1 The
company's offer, however, had one wrinkle. Because it had to be accepted before
the hostile offer was completed, shareholders were coerced into accepting it. A
shareholder who did not tender to the company because he preferred the hostile
offer would run a major risk. If other shareholders tendered to the company, the

hostile offer would be withdrawn and the non-tendering shareholder would be
left with, in effect, the back-end of the company's two-tier offer: the reduced
value of the remaining company shares after the repurchase of sixty-five percent
of its stock at a premium."2
In reviewing a challenge to this transaction, the Anderson, Clayton court
easily approved the company's offer under the traditional first step of the twostep review: Providing shareholders with a competitive alternative to a hostile
offer was self-evidently a valid corporate purpose. Yet, the court's analysis at
the second step of the review was far from routine. The court might have
reasoned, tautologically, that the company's offer should be considered "reasonably related" to the hostile offer by definition, merely because providing an
alternative to this offer was an appropriate corporate purpose. But the court did
not take this tack; instead, it carefully examined the alternative that the
company actually provided:
30. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986). For a more recent decision affirming the analysis of
Anderson, Clayton on similar facts, see Robert M. Bass Group, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,924.
31. 519 A.2d at 104. The court described the calculation by Anderson, Clayton's investment
banker of the value of the company's offer as follows: "$60 per share x 65.5% (proration figure) =
$39.34 cash + the per share value of the remaining 34.5% equity interest ($13 to $18 per remaining
interest) or in total a range of $52.34 to $57.34 per existing share." Id. at 108 n.6.
32. Id. at 113. Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1378
(1986), demonstrate that any repurchase by a target of less than the number of shares sought by the
hostile bidder has the potential to be coercive in this way. Perhaps for this reason, two-tier offers
have been most frequently used by management in recent years to support management buyouts or,
as in Anderson, Clayton, to defend against a single-tier hostile offer. See Grundfest, supra note 29.
In Anderson, Clayton, the coercive effect was magnified because the company's investment banker
declined to give an opinion on the expected value of Anderson, Clayton shares after the repurchase.
Instead, he estimated a value range of $13 to $18. 519 A.2d at 108. At all but the top end of this
range, the hostile offer was more valuable.
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The fatal defect with the Company Transaction ...

becomes apparent

when one attempts to apply the second leg of the Unocal test and asks
whether the defensive step is "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
The [hostile] offer poses a "threat" of any kind (other than a threat to the
incumbency of the Board) only in a special sense and on the assumption
that a majority of the Company's shareholders might prefer an alternative
to the [hostile] offer. On this assumption, it is reasonable to create an
option that would permit shareholders to keep an equity interest in the
firm, but, in my opinion, it is not reasonable in relation to such a "threat"
to structure such an option so as to preclude as a practical matter shareholders from accepting the [hostile] offer. 3
Thus, Anderson, Clayton clearly indicates that proportionality review, unlike
the policy conflict/primary purpose test, is not an empty threshold test: Defensive tactics must be justified in relationship to the particular terms of hostile
offers.3 4 This is an important result in its own right, even if it still leaves open
the basic issue of how the Delaware courts will balance defensive tactics against
the terms of hostile offers in other contexts.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A THREAT?
Thus far, it appears that, under the proportionality test, the nature of the
threat associated with a particular hostile offer limits the range of permissible
defensive tactics. It is a short step from this observation to the next question:
What constitutes a "threat" under the proportionality test? If "threat" means
that a takeover bid must pose a demonstrable risk of injury to target shareholders, might some takeover bids arguably not constitute any threat? The most
serious aspect of developing the likely content of the proportionality test is that,
in such cases, it might reasonably be construed to bar target management from
initiating any significant defensive measures at all.
The bids in Unocal, Moran, and Anderson, Clayton illustrate easy circumstances under the proportionality test for locating threats that might reasonably
seem to warrant a defensive response of some kind. In Unocal and Moran, the
structure of the hostile offers threatened to coerce shareholders into tendering on
unfavorable terms. In Anderson, Clayton, a hostile offer threatened to deprive
shareholders of access to management's alternative offer. However, leeway to
respond to these threats under the proportionality test will give little comfort to
defensive planners who wish to keep their companies independent."5 Indeed, a
broad reading of Anderson, Clayton leads to a kind of safe harbor for hostile
33. 519 A.2d at 112-13.
34. Id. Anderson, Clayton's analysis is developed even more pointedly in the recent Robert M.

Bass Group decision, where the Delaware Court of Chancery observes that a reasonable response to
an alleged underpriced offer is to "develop an even more valuable economic alternative" for
shareholders. (Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924, at 90,198.
35. A fair reading of Anderson, Clayton suggests that management's real motive was to maintain
independence.
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acquirers: In response to a hostile bid that is not coercive on its face, management can do no more than offer a genuine alternative. Although this reading
admittedly represents a significant narrowing of prior Delaware law, it accords
with Anderson, Clayton's holding that a hostile offer may be noncoercive when
it promises to cash out non-tendering shareholders at an equal price." As the
court explicitly states, tactics that preclude shareholders from accepting a hostile
offer are not, without more, reasonably related to the "threat" that shareholders
will accept the offer. 7 Thus, the case may support the proposition that the
proportionality test bars preclusive defensive action whenever non-coercive
takeover bids offer equal treatment to non-tendering shareholders. Such a rule
would dramatically restrict the flexibility of defensive planners in a market
where hostile bidders can easily raise cash financing.
Similarly, defensive planners cannot take great comfort in Anderson, Clayton's invitation to offer shareholders a noncoercive alternative. Inherent in

Anderson, Clayton's conception of providing shareholders with a choice is that
they may choose to accept the hostile offer. Considered from this perspective,
moreover, management's proposal for keeping a target company independent is
simply an alternative to a hostile offer rather than a presumptively favored
outcome. After all, if shareholders had selected Anderson, Clayton's self-tender
offer, the company would have remained independent. Anderson, Clayton
clearly allows management to offer the alternative of independence, but the logic
of the opinion seems to foreclose preclusive tactics that force shareholders to
accept the independence option (or prevent shareholders from choosing at all)."8
36. 519 A.2d at 112.
37. Id. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (summarizing the court's holding). For a
parallel analysis, see Robert M. Bass Group, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924.
38. Accord Robert M. Bass Group, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924, at 90,200.
The Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), demonstrates that the road to doctrinal clarity in Delaware is neither
straight nor straightforward. In that case, Newmont management believed the company was caught
between two potentially coercive offers. On the one hand, Ivanhoe Partners, a Boone Pickens
acquisition vehicle, had announced a hostile offer for 42% of Newmont's outstanding stock.
Although the Ivanhoe Partners offer stated that Ivanhoe Partners intended to acquire all remaining
shares for cash at the same price as the initial offer, the offer also stated, in contrast to the hostile
offer in Anderson, Clayton, "that no specific second step transaction had been devised, and that there
was no firm commitment to do so." Id. at 1339. As a result, the court concluded that the Ivanhoe
Partners offer was a two-tier offer "fit[ting] perfectly the mold of ... a coercive device." Id. at 1342.
On the other hand, Newmont management believed that Consolidated Gold Fields ("Gold
Fields"), Newmont's largest shareholder with 26% of the outstanding stock, also posed a threat of
coercion. Gold Fields held its shares subject to a 1983 standstill agreement that limited Gold Fields
to a maximum holding of 331/3%, but the standstill agreement terminated if any other party acquired
more than 9.9%. When Ivanhoe Partners intentionally increased its holding to 9.95%, Gold Fields
became free to "cancel the 1983 standstill agreement and acquire control of the company [presumably through market purchases], thus leaving the remaining shareholders without protection on the
'back end.' "
Because of this situation, Newmont's defensive tactic-financing a Gold Fields street sweep with
a $33 per share special dividend that gave Gold Fields 49.7% of the outstanding stock, subject to a
revised standstill agreement that limited Gold Fields's board membership to 40%--could be justified
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From the perspective of defensive planners who want to keep a target
independent (and "un-restructured"), the critical issue in evaluating Delaware's
new two-step proportionality review is what can cabin a broad reading of
Anderson, Clayton. Put in doctrinal terms, what "threats" from hostile bidders,
apart from unequal treatment for non-tendering shareholders, are sufficiently
grave to justify preclusive defensive tactics without offering any transactional
alternative at all? To take an obvious candidate, suppose that management
honestly believed that the price of a non-coercive hostile offer was inadequate;
in management's view, the securities market undervalued the target company's
assets by more than the premium offered by the acquirer. Would a preclusive
defense be "reasonably related" to the "threat" that shareholders might accept
what management deems to be an inadequate price? 9
To date, the cases interpreting proportionality review offer little guidance on
this single most important issue of what "threats" will support preclusive
defenses by target managers. In Unocal, where the proportionality test was
introduced, the Delaware Supreme Court provided a litany of factors that might
bear on the existence of a threat:
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails an
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on
the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of
illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being
as a careful effort to steer a path between the coercion threatened, explicitly or implicitly, by both

Ivanhoe Partners and Gold Fields.
Analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that the court also refers to Newmont's desire to

remain independent: "The Newmont board acted to maintain the company's independence and not
merely to preserve its own control." Id. at 1344. Our preferred interpretation of the court's opinion
treats this discussion of independence as loose language occurring in a context in which coercion was
the dominant consideration. If the court's language is interpreted as a statement that any hostile
offer is a threat to a company's independence (and that any defense is therefore reasonably related to
that threat), the proportionality test is reduced to rhetoric. Indeed, our goal in this article is to avoid
precisely this type of confusion.
39. Anderson, Clayton itself avoids the issue by noting that the case presented an unusual
circumstance in which target management did not claim that the price offered by the hostile bidder
was inadequate:

Unlike most of our cases treating defensive techniques, the Board does not seek to justify the
Company Transaction as necessary to fend off an offer that isinherently unfair.... The Board
recognizes that the [hostile] offer-being for all shares and offering cash consideration that the
Board's expert advisor could not call unfair-is one that a rational shareholder might prefer.
519 A.2d at 112. Other recent opinions, however, address underpriced offers as threats per se when

managers can identify more valuable economic alternatives. See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683
F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del. 1988); Robert M. Bass Group, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,924, at 90,198-99.
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offered in the exchange .... While not a controlling factor, it also seems to
us that a board may reasonably consider the basic stockholder interests at
stake, including those of short term speculators, whose actions may have
fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the expense of the long term
40
investor.
How might these factors rise to the threshold of "threats" able to justify a
preclusive defense against a non-coercive takeover bid? Clearly, these factors
can be threats only if a target's directors believe that shareholders will mistakenly accept a non-coercive offer.4 This returns us to our starting point: the
options open to the Delaware Supreme Court after determining that defensive
tactics required a more rigorous standard of review. The court might have
proceeded directly by vesting shareholders with a qualified right to choose
whether to accept a hostile offer without interference by target management.
Instead, the court opted to proceed indirectly by adopting an intermediate
standard of review to screen when directors might unilaterally block shareholders from choosing at all. But this intermediate standard can only lead back to the
core issue underlying defensive tactics: If takeover bids are not coercive, why not
allow shareholders to make up their own minds about how to respond?
This question highlights the inherent puzzle associated with the proportionality inquiry when a takeover bid lacks the obvious coercive features of the
Unocal and Ivanhoe Partnersoffers. The inquiry into the relationship between
the defensive tactic and the threat posed by the hostile offer is intelligible only if
the nature of the threat-how the offer would injure shareholders in the absence
of a defensive response-is understood. The only threat posed by a non-coercive
offer that management considers unfair, ill-timed, or underpriced, is the threat
that something will lead shareholders to accept it. But since such a threat is not
structurally coercive, it will warrant a defensive response only if the offer is
substantively coercive in that shareholders might somehow be led to accept
unfavorable substantive terms voluntarily. Put another way, substantive coercion posits a likely mistake by target shareholders who would not accept the
terms of an acquirer's offer if they knew what management knew about their
own company, about the acquisitions market, or about management itself. In
addition, since target management can be expected to tell shareholders, loudly
and often, what it knows, substantive coercion must also generally posit that

40. 493 A.2d at 955-56 (citations and footnote omitted). This litany is repeated in Ivanhoe

Partners,535 A.2d at 1341-42.
41. A possible exception concerns the impact of a hostile offer on the target's non-shareholder
constituencies. If directors could prefer the interests of these constituencies over those of shareholders, a hostile offer that shareholders would wish to accept in their own interest could pose a threat to
non-shareholder interests. However, the Delaware Supreme Court seems to have foreclosed such a
preference for non-shareholder interests in Revlon, when it observed: "A board may have regard for
various constituences in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders." 506 A.2d at 182. Thus, the constituency factor is no different from the

other factors set out by the court in Moran.
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shareholders do not believe what management says about the real value of the
company.
In sum, whether proportionality review can remain both internally consistent
and able to accommodate preclusive responses to offers that are structurally
innocuous, as in Anderson, Clayton, depends on the development of a coherent
account of substantive coercion. Without such an account, Delaware's intermediate standard can follow only one of two roads. Either internal logic will
dictate what we have termed the "broad reading" of Anderson, Clayton-that
is, a rule limiting preclusive defenses to the Unocal genre of coercive bids-or,
as proved to be the case with Delaware's prior high-profile effort at devising an
innovative standard in Singer, the new intermediate standard will collapse into
yet another rhetorical embellishment of the business judgment rule.

THE PROBLEM OF SUBSTANTIVE COERCION
As the preceding analysis suggests, substantive coercion requires an informational disparity between target managers and shareholders. Given a structurally
non-coercive offer of the Anderson, Clayton variety, two elements must be
present before rational shareholders can be described as "mistakenly" tendering
their shares because of substantive coercion. First, management must be able to
produce an expected market price for the company that is higher than the
hostile offer; that is, management's claim that the offer is inadequate must be
correct. But second, a majority of shareholders must nonetheless believe that
management will not deliver on its promise. Without the first element, shareholders who accept a structurally non-coercive offer have not made a mistake.
Without the second element, shareholders will believe management and reject
underpriced offers. Put another way, substantive coercion can only arise when
faithful managers prove unable to reassure a skeptical market.

MANAGERS' ABILITY TO GENERATE HIGHER
PRICES
When managers justify a preclusive defense on the ground that a hostile offer
is inadequate, they implicitly claim to be able to obtain greater value for
shareholders. Managers might be able to accomplish this in at least three ways:
(i) by bargaining for a better price from the bidder at hand; (ii) by locating
other bidders who will pay more for the company; or (iii) by operating the firm
so successfully that share prices will eventually exceed the offer price even
without selling the firm.42 Any of these assertions may be correct. As a practical
matter, moreover, embattled managers may attempt to justify defensive tactics
by making all three claims. Thus, target managers often compress these three
claims into a single statement: "The firm is worth at least X if we are allowed to
93,924, at 90,198-99
42. Cf Robert M. Bass Group, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(listing management's alternative methods of generating greater value-negotiating, selling, or

implementing a non-coercive restructuring transaction-as reasonable responses to the threat of an
underpriced offer).
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continue to operate it; we will repulse any offer below X, but we will negotiate
in good faith with the bidder at hand or anyone else who offers more than X." 4
But while all three claims are often asserted simultaneously, they should be
considered separately because they are unlikely to be equally plausible.
The least ambitious rationale for defensive tactics is the claim that management needs leverage to negotiate with a hostile bidder. Even in a competitive
acquisitions market, disaggregated shareholders may require a bargaining agent
to obtain top dollar for target assets." Without a coordinated response from
shareholders, any offer can succeed that exceeds the expected value of the firm
in the hands of existing management or other competing bidders. By contrast,
target managers who have the power to preclude hostile offers by deploying
defensive tactics may be able to compel acquirers to pay out the bulk of their
transaction gains.45 Thus, the claim that an offer is too low may simply mean
that there is room to dicker: Target managers reasonably believe that the offeror
will pay a higher price based on their knowledge of the true value of the target
company's assets or of the synergistic gains available to a particular offeror. The
force of this claim and the concomitant use of defensive tactics to induce an
offeror to sweeten its bid have been recently recognized by courts under
Revlon's analysis of the target board's obligation to conduct an auction that
maximizes shareholder value." 6 The claim stands as a distinct justification for
poison pills, quite apart from the potential value of the pill defense in insulating
shareholders from the effects of street sweeps or structurally coercive offers.4"
Beyond allowing managers to bargain credibly with particular offerors,
however, defensive tactics might also benefit target shareholders by providing
time for managers to "shop" the firm. In this case, managers who assert that an
offer is too low must claim private knowledge about either the acquisition
market or the value of the firm. They must believe that other potential acquirers
43. Needless to say, X is rarely given an exact dollar figure.
44. See, e.g., Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merger?, 28 J.L. & Econ. 151 (1985); Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target
Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 64-70
(1985).
45. In a perfectly competitive auction market, successful bidders must presumably pay more
than the value of the firm to the next highest bidder, even without management bargaining.
Bargaining by target managers, however, may extract some of the incremental surplus of the highest
bidder beyond the value of the firm to other bidders. In addition, such bargaining might offset
competitive and strategic imperfections in the auction market. Note that for present purposes we
assume that maximizing gains to target shareholders serves the broader objectives of shareholder
and social welfare. This view is generally accepted by the courts but remains controversial among
some commentators. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11; Schwartz, Search Theory and
the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L., Econ. & Org. 229 (1986).
46. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,711 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1988); Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, No. 88-9746 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 15, 1988) (order denying motion for preliminary injunction).
47. As Judge Sand observed in CRTF Corp., the pill defense "provides the directors with a
shield to fend off coercive offers and with a gavel to run an auction." [1987-1988 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,711, at 98,299.
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can be located who will pay more for the target than the hostile offeror. Because
second bidders cannot always be found, this claim is more problematic than
management's assertion that it can serve as a local bargaining agent. Nevertheless, "white knights" may emerge over time, particularly when management is
willing to share confidential information. The empirical literature indicates that
target management often can discover second bidders for target firms. 8
Finally, the most ambitious rationale for defensive tactics is management's
claim that it can better the price offered by a hostile bidder by preserving the
target's independence and generating value internally. In effect, management
asserts that the value of the target in its hands exceeds not only the target's preoffer valuation by the securities market, but also the premium price offered by
the acquirer. Management may rest an optimistic valuation of the target on
confidential information about the company, on beliefs about the future success
of the company's strategic plans, or more concretely, on an expert appraisal of
the value of the firm's assets. Again, management's claims may well be correct,
even when management relies on wholly public information to value the firm;
the securities market often appears to "discount" the asset values of target
firms. 9 Nevertheless, invoking the target's intrinsic value to justify continued
independence in the face of a premium offer is always a delicate argument for
the management of a target firm to make. Sooner or later, most shareholders sell
their shares on the market, and the market has already assessed managers'
efforts. Indeed, share prices might undervalue corporate assets precisely because
shareholders mistrust management investment policies.50
Even if the securities market undervalues the target firm for reasons other
than the company's poor performance, managers can seldom predict when the
market will come to accept their own assessment of the value of the company or
explain what would cause the market to alter its valuation."1

SHAREHOLDER MISTRUST
The mere fact that managers might truthfully claim to be able to improve
upon a hostile offer does not itself render an offer substantively coercive. A
second element is also required: Most shareholders must disbelieve managers'
claims. Otherwise, shareholders simply would listen to managers' advice and
reject underpriced offers out of hand. Indeed, this observation carries one step
48. See Jarrell, supra note 44, at 160-61.
49. See Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices
as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891 (1988).
50. See id. at 897-98. Corporate assets that generate large free cash flows in declining industries
are particularly likely to be discounted by share prices if shareholders fear that managers will
simply reinvest funds in the same industry. See, e.g., Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance,and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 323, 323-24 (1986).
51. A significant, if highly controversial, literature argues that biased or noisy share prices may
discount asset values, as many managers have long suspected. See Kraakman, supra note 49, at
898-99. However, the assertion that a target is underpriced, even if correct, cannot guarantee that it
will be accurately priced in the future unless management undertakes a major restructuring effort.
See id. at 924-30.
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further. A structurally non-coercive offer of the Anderson, Clayton variety that
is underpriced is likely to fail even if the only market participants who believe
managers' claim of underpricing are the arbitrageurs, as long as these arbi52
trageurs expect other savvy traders to share their valuation of the target.
Moreover, shareholders have good reason to mistrust managers' claims of
underpricing even if they know that defensive tactics can sometimes improve
upon the terms of hostile offers. Both academic analysis and recent experience 3
persuasively demonstrate that managers' efforts to defeat hostile bids often occur
or persist despite the best interests of shareholders. Indeed, apart from the
bidder itself, no one is less likely to be objective in appraising a hostile offer than
the target's incumbent board of directors and its top managers. Knowing this,
shareholders must naturally fear that in some cases management's claims of
value will be self-serving and, if believed, would impose a significant agency
cost, that is, the difference between the offer price and the subsequent lower
market price of the company after the offer is defeated. The fact that shareholders-and the securities market-are likely to accept a structurally non-coercive
offer, despite management's claims of value, is compelling evidence of the
shareholders' belief that the ability of managers to improve on the offer's terms
is outweighed by the risk that managers have misrepresented either their
abilities or their intentions.
This agency cost analysis is the chief justification for the broad reading of
Anderson, Clayton discussed earlier. The decision to tender or sell into the
market presupposes a judgment that the risk of management misrepresentation
outweighs the likelihood that management's claim of a higher value is correct."4
Because a court will be in no better position than the target's shareholders and
the market to evaluate management's claims about future value, there is no basis
for a court to override the evaluation of the marketplace by sanctioning preclusive defensive tactics. Thus, it is natural to conclude that the possibility that a
structurally non-coercive offer may be substantively coercive poses no threat to
shareholders on a risk-adjusted basis and, therefore, no defensive tactics are
warranted.
52. This is more complicated than it looks. The question is to what extent the market acts as a
check on shareholder skepticism. Suppose shareholders distrust managers but savvy market players
know better. Then arbitrageurs will buy in at above the low-ball market price only if they expect
enough other arbitrageurs to buy in to defeat the offer. We might safely say, however, that if there is
some finite probability that shareholders will defeat the offer and arbitrageurs believe that the firm
can do better, then target shares should trade at above the offer price and the offer will be defeated.
The remaining question is how large the initial probability must be to induce arbitrageurs to
participate.
53. The behavior of target management in Anderson, Clayton and Revlon provides recent
examples.
54. For this purpose, a shareholder's decision to sell into the market while the offer is pending
has the same implications, with respect to the shareholder's calculation of the likelihood that
management's claim of a higher value is correct, as a shareholder decision to wait and actually
tender. That the ultimate tender is then made by an arbitrageur is irrelevant. In this respect, the
arbitrageur acts simply as a less risk averse proxy for the selling shareholder who, in effect, has cast
her vote against management's valuation by selling. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 855-56.
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The empirical literature analyzing what happens to share values following
unsuccessful offers clarifies not only the basis for shareholder mistrust that
supports a broad reading of Anderson, Clayton but also the risk of substantive
coercion that supports a broad reading of Unocal's litany of potential threats.
Every empirical investigation of failed takeover attempts reaches *the same
dramatic conclusion. Unsuccessful first offers that are followed by successful
second offers yield better prices for target shareholders; but when first offers are
defeated and no second offer follows, share prices for target firms eventually
sink back to their pre-offer levels and thus inflict heavy opportunity costs on
target shareholders. This general pattern of results has been demonstrated by
two major studies of failed tender offers.55 It has been replicated in parallel
studies of failed mergers (as distinct from tender offers).5" In addition, the
pattern has emerged in other, narrower investigations of particular defensive
tactics. Thus, Jarrell's well-known study of defensive litigation," Mikkelson
and Ruback's investigation of greenmail payments,58 and recent SEC analyses of

poison pills59 all indicate that successful target defenses may indeed 'make
shareholders better off-but only if target firms are subsequently acquired in a
60
later transaction.
55. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers, 11 J. Fin. Econ.
183 (1983); Ruback, Do Target Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests?, in Corporate
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 137 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988). Bradley, Desai, and Kim
examined 26 targets of failed tender offers that were not subsequently acquired by a second offeror.
They found that, over a two-year period, the shareholders of these targets lost all gains associated
with their initial offers. Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra, at 194. Ruback confirmed these results in a
study employing a different design and extending over a three-year period. Ruback, supra, at
147-50. Many firms that resist first offers are later acquired. However, these results cannot confirm
the apparent view of the market that successful resistance is a poor gamble. See id. at 150. For a
critical review of the principal effort to show that shareholders benefit from remaining independent
after defeating a hostile offer, see Pound, Takeover Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A Reply to the
Kidder Peabody Study, Midland Corp. Fin. J., Summer 1986, at 33.
56. See Asquith, Merger Bids, Market Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. Fin. Econ.
51 (1983); Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. Fin.

Econ. 105 (1980). Both studies find that the announcement of a merger termination dissipates all
price gains associated with initial merger announcements. Asquith, supra, at 67; Dodd, supra, at
131.
57. See Jarrell, supra note 44, at 171-72.
58. W. Mikkelson & R. Ruback, Targeted Repurchases and Common Stock Returns (Sloan
School of Management Working Paper No. 1707-86, 1986). Consistent with the general literature,
Mikkelson and Ruback found that offer withdrawals following greenmail payments left shareholders with some gains over pre-offer prices but that these gains were eventually lost by the subset of
firms that retained their independence. Id. at 30.
59. Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, The Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target
Shareholders (1986).
60. One caveat relates to leveraged recapitalizations and other restructuring defenses in which
target management attempts to defeat a hostile offer by pursuing its own reorganization plan.
Recall, for example, management's offer in Anderson, Clayton. Shareholders are likely to benefit in
these cases even if management's "offer" succeeds because, in effect, management plays the role of a
second bidder. See Kleiman, Shareholder Gains From Leveraged Cash-Outs, 1 J. Applied Corp.
Fin., Spring 1988, at 46. In these cases, then, the question is not whether shareholders will benefit
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PROPORTIONALITY AND SUBSTANTIVE COERCION
The empirical literature poses a difficult challenge for the proportionality test
because it presents a mixed message: Shareholders have good reason to be
skeptical about preclusive defensive tactics, even though their skepticism is often
mistaken. The implication of this message differs depending on whose perspective one adopts. From the external perspective of shareholders and the market,
which cannot distinguish when management's representations about future
value are correct from when they are self-serving, hostile offers that are
structurally non-coercive cannot pose a threat; accordingly, defensive tactics that
1
preclude such offers can only be harmful. From the internal perspective of
well-intentioned managers whose representations about value really are correct,
however, some offers may nevertheless threaten shareholder welfare. Adopting
the market's external perspective naturally leads to proscribing defenses against
structurally non-coercive offers. But the price of such a rule is to abandon
judicial deference to managers' business judgment-in this context a presumption that management's representations about future value are more often than
not correct-on the basis of the movement of share prices and the aggregate
2
statistical data that support the opposite presumption. On the other hand,
adopting the internal perspective and acceding to defensive tactics solely on the
basis of managers' claims of intrinsic value imposes large and easily measurable
agency costs on shareholders across all hostile offers considered in aggregate.
Such a permissive rule would render the proportionality test meaningless
whenever managers alleged that hostile offers were underpriced.
It follows that a meaningful application of the proportionality test to substantive coercion must recognize that management's representations about future
value will sometimes be wrong and sometimes be right. For the game to be
worth the candle, courts applying the proportionality test must be able to
improve on the market's efforts to distinguish when management is right and
when it is wrong. Otherwise, the aggregate market data would support a total
ban on defensive responses to structurally non-coercive offers.

at all relative to pre-bid share prices, but whether they will gain as much as they would have gained
if the hostile offer had succeeded. To us, management's preference for its own restructuring plan

over a hostile offer implicates precisely the same concerns that provoked Revlon's auctioneering
norm in bidding contests between two offerors. See supra note 26. This point emerges with
particular force on the facts of the recent Robert M. Bass Group decision, where the acquirer-the
Bass Group--offered to match the exact terms of management's recapitalization plan and pay a

higher price to target shareholders if the Bass Group were permitted to purchase the equity position
that management had reserved for itself under the recapitalization plan. See Robert M. Bass Group
v. Evans, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924, at 90,194-95 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1988).
61. Recall that share prices drop dramatically whenever hostile offers are defeated, thus
inflicting a significant loss on shareholders. This loss is offset by even greater gains when a second
offer follows and is followed by even larger losses when no second offer materializes. See supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text.
62. The ex ante response of share prices strongly suggests a presumption against management.
Ex post statistical analysis can only be suggestive. See supra note 55.
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DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE PROPORTIONALITY
TEST
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the most difficult part of developing
an effective proportionality test is the challenge of offers that are assertedly
substantively-but not structurally-coercive, and that the central problem in
applying the proportionality test to substantive coercion is suspect information.
If management can correctly claim that the company is worth more than the
value of a hostile offer, then substantive coercion is a real threat that may
support preclusive defensive tactics under an intermediate standard of review.
By contrast, if management's claims about value are incorrect, there is no threat
to target shareholders and preclusive tactics are inappropriate. The premise of
an intermediate standard of review is that the courts must exercise independent
judgment in balancing the reasonable skepticism of shareholders (which considered alone would suggest prohibiting preclusive tactics) against the presumptive
expertise of managers (which considered alone would suggest blanket business
judgment protection of preclusive tactics). The hard question is: Can judges
screen management's claims about value more accurately than the market? The
answer, we believe, lies in how an effective proportionality test might elicit more
careful analysis by the courts and, as a result, more accurate representations by
target managers about the bases of their valuation claims in the first instance.

THE ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE
PROPORTIONALITY TEST
The elements of an effective test of the proportionality of defensive tactics to
an allegedly threatening hostile offer follow from the ambiguities in the Delaware Supreme Court's exegesis of existing doctrine. First, if the test is to serve
as a true intermediate standard-that is, as a test more stringent than Cheff but
less rigorous than the intrinsic fairness test-it must clearly identify the nature
of the threats that fix the permissible range of defensive tactics. Second, an
effective proportionality test must be more than a threshold test; it must
explicitly link the range of permissible tactics to the scope or magnitude of the
identified threat. Finally, an effective test must offer courts meaningful guidance
in evaluating the likely accuracy of management's representations about both
the magnitude of the threat posed by a hostile offer and how, given that threat,
management's particular defensive response would serve shareholder interests. 3

63. For a similar analysis of the promise of the proportionality test and a discussion of its likely
course of development, see City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., No. 10,105, slip op. at 20-26 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 1, 1988) (1988 WL 116,453). This decision, which refers to the working paper that

preceded this article, introduces an analytical framework parallel to this article's and further
develops the argument for searching judicial review of management's claim that a structurally noncoercive offer is a "threat," based solely on the risk that shareholder choice might pose to
management's own alternative plans. Id. at 24-26.
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A Typology of Threats
The first element of an effective test concerns the nature of threats posed by
hostile offers. Merely limiting relevant threats to threats to shareholderinterest
-as Revlon already does within the limited confines of bidding contests"would stress that Unocal's litany of relevant circumstances rests on the fundamental, and seemingly unobjectionable, norm that shareholder interests are
primary. Target management may take other corporate constituencies into
account in framing defensive plans, but only to the extent it benefits shareholders by doing so.6" Beyond this, our analysis suggests that the variety of "threats"
discussed by the courts might be usefully grouped into three categories: (i)
opportunity loss, or the Anderson, Clayton dilemma that a hostile offer might

deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior alternative
offered by target management; (ii) structural coercion, or the risk that disparate
treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders' tender
decisions; and, finally, (iii) substantive coercion, or the risk that shareholders
will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic value.
Of these three classes of threats, only a claim of substantive coercion requires
that a court do very much more than review a simple statement of management's immediate plans and the terms of a hostile offer. Where management
responds to the threat of opportunity loss from a hostile offer by proferring an
alternative transaction, a court need only determine, as in Anderson, Clayton,
whether management's alternative is itself structurally coercive."' Similarly,
analysis of whether a hostile offer (or management alternative) is structurally
64. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon).
65. We read Revlon's stress on the primacy of shareholder interests in framing the duties of
corporate directors as a specific application of a fundamental norm of corporate law. See supra note
41 and accompanying text. Management is no more free to sacrifice shareholder interests to those of
other corporate constituencies in responding to a hostile offer than it is free to favor one participant
over all others in an ongoing bidding contest. Any different understanding of management's
fiduciary obligation to shareholders would render most of corporate law incoherent.
66. A problem may develop in distinguishing a preclusive defensive tactic from management's
proffer of an alternative transaction. For example, defensive restructurings can be cast in a form
that requires shareholder approval, whether by tender or vote, or in a form that may be implemented on management's authority alone. From our perspective, the distinguishing characteristic is
the presence of shareholder choice. See R. Gilson, supra note 13, at 751-52. If shareholders retain
the option of selecting the hostile offer, management's alternative offer, or neither offer, then
management's transaction is an alternative that a judge need review only for structural coercion. If,
by contrast, management effects the transaction without allowing shareholders the opportunity to
reject it, then the threat must lie in the coercive character-whether structural or substantive-of
the hostile offer with a resulting difference in the nature of the court's review.
The same dilemma-whether a management restructuring plan is merely a defensive tactic or an
alternative proposal for the sale of the company-is also central to the Delaware Supreme Court's
exegesis of proportionality review. Under Revlon, target management's duty to secure the highest
price for the company is triggered by a conclusion that the company will be sold. If a management
restructuring is viewed as an alternative control transaction, then a decision has been made to sell
the company and Revlon is triggered; if management action is only a defensive response, the
proportionality test remains applicable. Compare Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard,
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coercive does not require detailed review, especially since Anderson, Clayton
provides offerors a safe harbor by identifying the characteristics of an offer that
is not structurally coercive.67 An allegation of substantive coercion, however,
places a more demanding burden on both the target's management and the
reviewing court.

To support an allegation of substantive coercion, a meaningful proportionality test requires a coherent statement of management's expectations about the
future value of the company. From the perspective of shareholders, substantive

coercion is possible only if management plausibly expects to better the terms of a
hostile offer-whether by bargaining with the offeror, by securing a competitive bid, or by managing the company better than the market expects.68 To make
such a claim requires more than the standard statement that a target's board
and its advisers believe the hostile offer to be "grossly inadequate." In particular, demonstrating the existence of a threat of substantive coercion requires a
showing of how-and when-management expects a target's shareholders to do
better.6 9
A statement of management's plans tor doing better might look to the role of
defensive tactics in providing time or bargaining leverage to support the eventual sale of the firm at a higher price. Alternatively, it might promise to increase
the market price of the firm's shares by independently managing the firm's
operations with a plan to sell assets, to cut costs, or to follow another strategy for
improving the company's performance. Either way, however, management must
set forth its plan in sufficient detail to permit the court independently to evaluate
the plausibility of management's claim. 0

682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988), with Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987). See infra note 72.
67. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
69. An alternative construction of the proportionality test that may be functionally equivalent to
requiring management to present detailed plans in order to show a threat of substantive coercion is
to require a similarly detailed showing of management plans at the later stage of evaluating
management's specific response to the alleged threat of an underpriced offer. At least one recent
Delaware decision seems to incline in this alternative direction. See Robert M. Bass Group v.
Evans, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924 (Del. Ch. 1988). Insofar as both.of these
constructions of the proportionality test would require the same showing from management and
reach the same result, these two versions of the test would be practically identical. However, for the
reasons indicated above, see supra text accompanying notes 42-62, we prefer to insert management's
defense of its plans into the determination of whether a "threat" exists rather than into a subsequent
evaluation of management's response to an asserted threat. The proposition that a premium offer
might threaten shareholder interests apart from management's specific plans seems needlessly
abstract and vulnerable to manipulation.
70. This type of disclosure also could be mandated under the federal securities laws. The
Securities and Exchange Commission currently interprets Exchange Act rule 13e-3 to require quite
detailed disclosure about the basis for a board of directors' belief that the price offered in a freezeout merger is fair, as well as the purposes, benefits, and detriments of the transaction. See In re
Meyers Parking Sys., Exchange Act Release No. 26,069, 41 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1061 (Sept. 12,
1988). It would be straightforward to amend rule 14d-9 to require a statement of the scope discussed
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The discipline imposed by requiring management to state clearly just how it
intends to cause the price of the company's shares to increase is a critical check
on knee-jerk resort to assertions that a hostile offer's price is inadequate. For
example, if management believes that the price of a hostile offer is inadequate
because the market undervalues the company's unused investment tax credits, as
the court apparently believed in Smith v. Van Gorkom,' an acceptable statement of the threat to shareholders would require management to describe the
steps that it planned to correct the market's valuation. 2

Proportionality: the Link Between Threat and Response
After defining the threat posed by a hostile offer, the second element in an
effective proportionality test lies in detailing the relationship between the threat
and the range of permissible defensive tactics. This relationship follows logically
from the nature of the threat. Where the sole threat to shareholder interests is
the risk that a hostile takeover might deprive shareholders of a superior
management alternative, as in Anderson, Clayton, the only permissible defensive
measures will be those that safeguard shareholders' choice between the hostile
bid and management's alternative. 3 By contrast, when a hostile offer poses a
significant threat of substantive or structural coercion, preclusive defensive
tactics may be justified. A showing that some such response is justified, however,
cannot mean that management enjoys complete discretion. In particular, some
responses to hostile offers, such as leveraged restructurings, more closely resemble counteroffers than preclusive defenses. When these plans are deployed in
in the text in connection with a management recommendation that shareholders reject a pending
tender offer.
71. 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
72. Cf Terry v. Penn Cent., 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1981) (Penn Central's strategy used up loss
carry-forwards by acquiring profitable companies). We need not resolve here whether the securities
market might, as a theoretical matter, underprice target assets even in the absence of significant
nonpublic information. See Kraakman, supra note 49, at 898-901. Under some circumstances,
target management might plausibly assert such underpricing and seek to demonstrate that the
present value of the company's expected cash flows exceeds the hostile offer. However, such a
demonstration alone would not justify preclusive defensive tactics without a plan (as in Terry) to
assure that shareholders will realize the company's asset values in share prices. The price of the
company's shares is an essential check on management's plan, even in instances of apparent
underpricing, for two reasons. First, apparent underpricing by the securities market always creates
suspicion about management's investment policies that is exceedingly difficult for a court to
evaluate. Second, regardless of the origins of apparent underpricing, managers have a fiduciary
responsibility to attempt to correct underpricing on behalf of shareholders. For further discussion of
these issues, see Kraakman, supra note 49, at 933-39.
73. This seems the best reading of recent cases that allow target companies to facilitate
conducting an auction of the company by declining to redeem a poison pill. See CRTF Corp. v.
93,711
Federated Dep't Stores, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1988); Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, No. 88-9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988);
Henley Group v. Sante Fe S. Pac. Corp., No. 88-9569 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1988). Although
discussed in terms of the board's discretion in conducting a Revlon auction, this issue can be
analyzed under the proportionality test without creating another standard, i.e., a separate Revlon
auction obligation that multiplies doctrinal labels and creates its own ambiguities.

270

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 44, February 1989

conjunction with preclusive defensive tactics, they deprive shareholders of the
opportunity to choose not merely the problematic offer at hand, but any future

offer as well. Thus, courts might reasonably require an especially probing
demonstration of a benefit to shareholder interests before permitting manage-

ment to execute such insulated restructuring plans. For example, a refusal to
redeem a poison pill in the face of a two-tier hostile offer would be reasonably
related to the threat of structural coercion embodied in the offer, but a leveraged

restructuring to thwart the same offer would not be reasonably related to the
same threat because the restructuring response would foreclose all future offers,

including those that posed no threat at all. Such a preclusive restructuring plan
would fail the proportionality test unless management could establish that it
was substantively superior to the outsider's best offer.74
The Weight of Management's Burden
Finally, the third element of an effective proportionality test goes to the heart
of meaningful judicial review: The weight of management's burden in persuading the court that management's defensive response will make shareholders
better off, given the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by a hostile offer.
As with confirming the existence of a threat in the first instance,"m courts should
have little difficulty in reviewing management's claims of structural coercion or
a potential opportunity loss for target shareholders. The terms of a hostile offer
or of management's alternative plan will suffice to establish the bona tides of
these "threats." The real challenge to judicial review arises when management
alleges that a hostile offer is substantively coercive because management-if
only it were allowed to pursue defensive tactics that would provide it with the
opportunity-could better the hostile offer through its own salesmanship or
management efforts. Here, the court must be free to exercise its independent
judgment in weighing whether management's plans present a plausible story: a

74. The hard case, once again, is management's allegation that the hostile offer competing with a
restructuring plan is substantively coercive. A broad reading of Revlon or Anderson, Clayton would

lead to a total ban on preclusive restructuring plans on the theory that shareholders should always
be permitted a choice when the sole issue is comparative value. Arguably, however, management
ought to have the opportunity to persuade a court that shareholders have underestimated the real

value of management's proposed alternative. This is especially important when recapitalization
leaves a hard-to-value equity "stub" in shareholder hands. Additionally, the fact that recapitalizations often do generate considerable value for shareholders suggests that the risks of permitting
preclusive recapitalizations are smaller than the parallel risks of allowing management to retain the
firm's independence without significant change. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (drop
in share prices following unsuccessful bids). For recent examples of judicial scrutiny under the

proportionality test of defensive tactics to protect a restructuring plan, see Robert M. Bass Group,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

93,924, at 90,198-99 (restructuring enjoined when it

appeared likely to preclude economically superior offer); Henley Group, No. 88-9569 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 18, 1988) (preclusive tactics proportional in part because management's previous efforts to sell
the firm made entrenchment unlikely).
75. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
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goal that improves on the value of the hostile offer and a means that is
reasonably likely to achieve the goal.
Although a court must credit management's expertise in passing on management's plans, management's word is by no means the only evidence available to
the court. The court can also examine the specificity and completeness of

management's plan, the deliberations of the target's board, expert testimony
from both sides, and, most important, the firm's performance history. In
particular, evidence that management had alleged substantive coercion in the
face of an earlier hostile offer and had already failed to meet its own projections

of firm performance would seriously undermine allegations of substantive
coercion. So, for example, an effective proportionality test would impose a
heavier burden on claims of underpricing by Marshall Field's management in
connection with B.A.T.'s hostile offer than would have been appropriate in
connection with Carter Hawley Hale's earlier hostile offer, given Marshall
6
Field's lackluster performance during the period between the two offers.1

WHY AN EFFECTIVE PROPORTIONALITY TEST CAN
WORK
To this point, our development of an effective proportionality test remains
subject to the same criticism that we leveled at the Cheff test. Particularly in the
common case where management alleges substantive coercion because of price
inadequacy, we would be hard pressed to demonstrate a necessary benefit from
the proportionality test as we have developed it thus far. A deceptively clever
story about future values might seem to be as capable of validating preclusive
defensive tactics under the proportionality test as a clever story about policy
conflicts was able to do under the old Cheff test. In our view, however, this
criticism misses the systemic institutional effects of searching judicial review. A
proportionality test that demands serious justifications for defensive tactics-and
examines these justifications through the lens of shareholder interest-would
serve a valuable screening function, even if it could not always guarantee the
accuracy of management's representations. Such a test would facilitate planning
in the easy cases where hostile offers did not threaten substantive coercion. For
targets, the option of providing shareholders with an alternative plan would
always be a defense, even to wholly non-coercive offers; for acquirers, the risk of
76. Carter Hawley Hale's best offer for Marshall Field was $42 per share on February 1, 1978.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 280 (7th Cir. 1981). Four years later, B.A.T.
successfully offered $30 per share. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420

(S.D.N.Y. 1982). To compare the two prices, we calculated the future value, on the date of the
successful B.A.T. offer, of the $42 per share that Maishall Field's shareholders were denied by
management's defeat of the Carter Hawley Hale offer. The shareholders would have had $57.14 on
the date of the $30 B.A.T. offer if the Carter Hawley Hale offer had been accepted and the proceeds
reinvested at an eight-percent assumed rate. Although this rough calculation ignores a variety of

factors, most importantly the impact of taxes on non-exempt Marshall Field shareholders, the point
is clear: The plans of Marshall Field's management to secure greater value for its shareholders left
something to be desired.
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preclusive defensive tactics could be measurably reduced by treating all target
shareholders equally. In the harder case where management alleged substantive
coercion, the demands of an effective proportionality test would impose a
discipline that would reduce management's incentives to resort to preclusive
defensive tactics in the first place.
Consider how a searching review under the proportionality test might affect
managers who were tempted to veto a hostile offer without a concrete plan to
generate greater value, either through continued management of the company or
through selling the comnpany at a later, more advantageous time. In other words,
suppose management simply preferred to maintain the company's independence, a not unfamiliar sentiment. The mere task of establishing a plausible
claim of substantive coecion-of framing a credible plan for increasing the
company's stock price in the shadow of a probing judicial review-would itself
be a significant deterrent to management entrenchment. If management's initial
opposition to the hostile offer were unreflected, the exercise of developing a plan
capable of surviving serious review under the proportionality test would provide
an occasion to reconsider the decision to resist. Even if management were coolly
disposed to resist a hostile offer in full knowledge of its superiority, the duty to
frame a plan-to put implausible expectations on paper-would tend to deter.
The less plausible management's claims actually were, the more difficult management would find the task of constructing a plan. Beyond this, a bogus plan
would invite future reputational losses and shareholder conflicts even if it did
not create a risk of liability for its authors. After all, managers would find
themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to live with values and
timetables that they could not expect to meet.
Under an effective proportionality test, moreover, the difficulty of constructing a plausible but inaccurate account of future value would be increased by the
reluctance of secondary participants in a target's decisionmaking to acquiesce in
such an effort. Presumably any case for substantive coercion would involve
investment bankers as valuation experts and outside directors as formal decisionmakers. For an investment banker, passing on the credibility of a specific
management plan would differ from merely opining on the fairness of an offer
price because it would involve both greater specificity and an accountability
check. Management's plan will eventually either succeed or fail for reasons
likely to be discernible at the time the opinion was rendered; subsequent events
will measure the quality of the investment banker's earlier opinion. Thus, the
reputational consequences of supporting ill-conceived plans would encourage a
considerable measure of private enforcement by investment bankers.77
For independent directors, who must assume formal responsibility for implementing management's plan to generate value, there are even stronger reasons
for expecting conscientious self-enforcement under an explicit proportionality
77. As the facts in Anderson, Clayton show, valuations by investment bankers already act as a
constraint on preclusive defensive tactics under the proportionality standard. See supra notes 31-33
and accompanying text (investment banker placed similar values on management plan and hostile

offer).
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test. On the fair assumption that independent directors generally wish to
discharge their duties faithfully-if only their duties are sufficiently clear-we
would expect a searching internal analysis of any management plan that the
board would be expected to justify in court. We would also expect that after
ratifying such a plan, independent directors would take particular care to assure
the faithful implementation of the plan or, if the plan could not be implemented,
to rectify the resulting harm to target shareholders.
Finally, beyond creating incentives for self-enforcement, an effective proportionality test would harness the acquisitions market itself in screening representations about substantive coercion. If target management misrepresented the
prospects for generating future value on behalf of its shareholders, in all
probability a second hostile offer would eventually follow.78 One reason to
expect a second offer is that target share prices would be likely to decline to
reflect management's failure to meet its projections. 9 However, a meaningful
proportionality test would provide another reason: Given management's unsuccessful past performance, a second hostile offeror would have much less to fear
from preclusive defensive tactics based on a claim of substantive coercion. In
effect, target management's past failure with its initial plan would undermine
its credibility and open the target to the market. As a result, target management
-including its independent directors-would have little incentive to mislead the
court knowingly by misrepresenting the firm's prospects in the first instance. At
most, misrepresentation at the time of the initial offer would only buy target
management temporary relief from the acquisitions market.
Together, then, the incentive effects of an obligation to document a claim of
substantive coercion and the prospect of a market challenge to unrealistic
representations make judicial review of management's plans under an explicit
proportionality test. a potentially powerful check on spurious defensive tactics.
Although courts are not better equipped to evaluate management's representations about future value than the market, the important point is that courts do
not need to be more expert than the market to play a screening role. Judicial
review can force corporate participants themselves to articulate clearly the
interests of shareholders, the duties of corporate fiduciaries, and the expectations
of management. The processes set in motion by forcing management to articulate the concrete link between its plan and shareholder interests can, by its own
force, shift management's institutional incentives enough to provide an effective
screen against ill-conceived or self-interested defensive tactics. In the end, if
courts require a persuasive showing of a threat to shareholder interests under
the proportionality test, they will not have to make close decisions about the
feasibility of particular business strategies: Corporate participants, including
target managers, will pre-screen strategies for the courts.

78. Again, the experience of Marshall Field & Co. serves as an example. See supra notes 61-72
and accompanying text.
79. Recall that share prices decline to pre-bid levels when hostile offers for targets fail and no
subsequent offer follows. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our analysis of how an effective proportionality test might function demonstrates that the Delaware courts have room to carve out a workable intermediate
standard of review between nominal scrutiny under the old Cheff standard on
the one hand, and the intrinsic fairness test or the equally stringent broad
reading of Anderson, Clayton on the other. The room for this intermediate
standard is defined by the risk of substantive coercion: the prospect that
shareholders who mistakenly disbelieve well-intentioned managers' representations about future value may be led to tender to a hostile bidder against their
own best interests. This risk is the real threat that underlies the litany of
coercive circumstances identified by Unocal and its progeny as a possible basis
for preclusive tactics.
Yet, substantive coercion is a slippery concept. To note abstractly that
management might know shareholder interests better than shareholders themselves do cannot be a basis for rubber-stamping management's pro forma claims
in the face of market skepticism and the enormous opportunity losses that
threaten target shareholders when hostile offers are defeated. Preclusive defensive tactics are gambles made on behalf of target shareholders by presumptively
self-interested players. Although shareholders may win or lose in each transaction, they would almost certainly be better off on average if the gamble were
never made in the absence of meaningful judicial review. By minimizing
management's ability to further its self-interest in selecting its response to a
hostile offer, an effective proportionality test can raise the odds that management resistance, when it does occur, will increase shareholder value.
Over the next year, the currents of corporate litigation are likely to bring the
Delaware courts to a crossroads. A parade of novel defensive tactics, bolstered
by the new Delaware takeover statute, has placed the power to defeat a hostile
bid within reach of target managements. If the proportionality test lives up to its
promise as a meaningful intermediate standard of review, it can do much to
correct the widespread view that Delaware law has taken a definitive turn
against hostile acquisitions. By contrast, if the proportionality test follows the
rhetorical slide seemingly suggested by some aspects of the analysis in Unocal
and Ivanhoe Partners, it will become little more than another reminder to
business planners to watch what the Delaware courts do and not what they say.

